回顧歷史：論美國對中國民主進程的態度 盼復國
Does the U.S. care about China’s Democracy?
A Reflection on the Chaotic Past
從政治學的角度來談，美國對「兩個中國」這一議題的官方態度向來被歸納為一種 「故意模棱兩可的政策」（policy of deliberate ambiguity）。這一結論可能聽起來讓人感覺有些過於刻薄和以偏概全，但這實際上僅僅是對美國，中華人民共和國（PRC）以及中華民國（ROC）過去數十年間的三方關係的一番客觀審視，並不受任何政治傾向所左右。
The U.S. attitudes towards the issue of “Two-Chinas” has been predominantly characterized as a “policy of deliberate ambiguity.” This statement may sound harsh and overly-generalized, but it is merely an objective observation of the historical three-way relations among the U.S., the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Republic of China (ROC) for the past decades regardless of any political inclinations.
主流觀念認為，美國在外交政策刻意對臺灣問題的保持一種曖昧的態度對於穩定兩岸關係至關重要。相反，明確承認臺灣的主權無疑會直接引起中共的反對舉措，以至於進一步挑戰美國在東亞及其他地區的合法性。但在另一方面，鑑於過去幾十年來臺灣海峽的斷斷續續的衝突，無論是從道德角度還是從務實角度出發，這種對中台問題的「歧義政策」同時受到了不同程度的批評[1]。在現如今美中關係不斷惡化的環境下，在美國有越來越多的政治家，評論員和社會活動家呼籲美國政府重新評估其對於中台問題的立場。
The mainstream opinions proffer that the policy of deliberate ambiguity of U.S. foreign policy to Taiwan issues is critical to stabilizing the cross-strait relation. In contrast, it is believed that explicit recognition of Taiwan sovereignty would undoubtedly induce PRC opposition, which may further challenge U.S. legitimacy in East Asia or beyond. On the other hand, in light of the intermittent conflict across the Taiwan Strait over the past decades, this strategic ambiguity has also been facing criticisms from both moral and pragmatic perspectives [1]. Amid the status quo deteriorating relations between U.S. and PRC, an increasing number of politicians, commentators, and activists call for a reevaluation of the U.S. position towards China-Taiwan issues.
然而，這些對於美國中臺戰略的評價，無論是背書，批判還是呼籲修繕，其共同點均是出於對美國自身利益的考慮，而並不是爲解決臺灣問題本身。美國早已因自身的諸多社會矛盾，左右兩派的政治分歧，以及中東的軍事和外交博弈而困擾不堪；對絕大多數美國人而言，「中國」或多或少也許只是一個令其感到遙遠和無關的抽象概念。比如從最近的事件來看，喬治･佛洛德（George Floyd）之死能夠迅速掀起一場席捲美國各地的政治風暴；而對於香港反對逃犯條例修訂草案的遊行，整個美國社會卻普遍持一種相對冷漠的態度。 此外，在美國兩黨制政治體系的大環境下，遠在東亞的臺海關係議題儼然已經變質成一種被政客們用來迎合選民及煽動情緒宣傳工具。
Nevertheless, whether it is an endorsement, an opposition, or a reevaluation, one common thing they share is that they all stem from the American interests, not for the sake of solving the Cross-Strait issue itself. U.S. people have been struggling with various domestic and international issues by themselves, and “China” is more or less an abstract concept that seems detached to them. This argument can be substantiated by comparing the dramatic reactions towards George Floyd’s death and the overall apathy among U.S. society towards 2019 – 20 Hong Kong protests. Additionally, under the U.S. Two-party system, the issue of Cross-Strait relations has insidiously turned into a tool that will only be used by the politicians to appeal to their base voters' desires and prejudices.
隨著中華人民共和國成為世界第二大經濟體，出於多種因素，中國大陸和美國的政治，已經緊密地交織在一起。具體是哪些因素促就了這種局面並不是本文討論的中心，重點在於我們必須認識到任何與中華人民共和國的公開對抗從美國角度來看都屬於一種兩敗俱傷的下策 [2]。但凡對美國歷史有基本瞭解的人都會明白，美國從不訴諸於以相互破壞的方式來解決任何衝突，無論是單純出於道德考慮還是權宜之計。
As PRC becomes the World’s Second-Largest Economy, the political, economic, and security interests of PRC and the U.S. are already profoundly intertwined for a multitude of factors. Though these factors are not central to this article, the takeaway is that an open confrontation with PRC would be considered a “mutually destructive interaction” [2]. Anyone with basic knowledge of U.S. history would have known that the U.S. would never intend to handle any strife in a mutually destructive way, whether it is for the cause of morality or expedient.
在本文中，「中國」一詞在多數場合僅被作爲一個非政治的區域性概念，可以用來泛指大陸，臺灣乃至香港澳門。通過對美中關係的歷史略作鑽研，筆者可以得出一個悲觀結論：模棱兩可（ambiguous）一詞可能並不能最準確地定義美國對中國態度。從某種程度而言，類似於「反覆無常」甚至「兩面三刀」這樣的詞也許更加恰當。需要指出的是，在此筆者並沒有任何貶低美國文化，民族性以及價值觀的意圖。除此之外筆者從未否認美國對推進人類社會發展所做出的巨大科技和人文貢獻。本文僅旨在通過回顧美中關係的歷史，客觀評價美國對中國的政治立場。本文的重點將會放在從第二次世界大戰開始之後的大約四十年之間美國和中國的外交記錄上，因爲這段血腥和動蕩的時期對於美中關係非常具有代表意義。
In this article, the term “China” is regarded as a regional and nonpolitical concept that can be broadly referred to as Mainland, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. Searching through the timeline of U.S. – China relations, the author has reached a pessimistic conclusion that “ambiguous” may not be the most precise word to label the related U.S. policies. To some extent, phrases like “capricious” or even “dubious” may be better candidates. It should be noted that by no means would the author disparage the culture, ethnicity, and values of the United States; nor would the author even consider denying the tremendous intellectual and philanthropic contributions that American people have been made in shaping a better future for humanity. This article only aims to provide an evaluation of the U.S. – China relations from a historical perspective. More precisely, we will primarily concentrate on a chaotic period of four decades, starting from World War II.
在第二次中日戰爭（Second Sino-Japanese War）全面爆發後，中華民國很快得到了美國政府和民眾的大力支持。1938年，美國總統佛蘭克林･羅斯福（Franklin D. Roosevelt，民主黨）向中華民國國民政府提供了2500萬美元的信貸，到1940年，這一數字被擴大到1億美元。除此之外，居住於南京公共租界的美國公民積極地提供了大量人道主義援助，使數以萬計的中國人倖免於難。與此同時，美國媒體公開了大量日本的戰爭罪行，使得美國社會的輿論壓倒性地偏向中國並譴責日本。（注：筆者對現代日本持高度肯定的態度；本文旨在重申客觀事實，並無煽動任何反日情緒之意圖。）
After the outbreak of a full-scale war between China and Japan, China has received immense U.S. support from both governmental and popular sources. In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democrat) extended a $25 million credit to the Nationalist regime, and this number was expanded to $100 million in 1940. Some U.S. citizens also became actively involved in an international effort to protect tens of thousands of Chinese in the International Settlement in Nanjing and to publicize Japanese military actions. In this period, American public opinion overwhelmingly favored China and denounced Japan. (Note: the author holds a highly positive attitude towards modern Japan; the article only intends to restate objective facts, not to incite any anti-japan sentiment.)
日軍進攻珍珠港後，美國與中華民國正式成立了戰時同盟。美國明確表示將在任何戰後協議中予以中華民國優待，並承諾中華民國將獲得日本佔領的所有地區的主權，尤其是是滿洲和臺灣地區。但另一方面，美國卻又同時在嘗試與中國共產黨和八路軍建立官方關係。美軍觀察組（The United States Army Observation Group），即迪克西使團（Dixie Mission），前往了在延安的中國共產黨根據地，考察衡量了美國向共產黨提供援助的可能性。觀察組的反饋報告中提及，中國的共產黨組織可以作爲美國在戰時和戰後的有價值的盟友。毫無疑問，這一提議立即受到了蔣中正總統以及美國政府中的親國民黨派的一致反對和譴責。迪克西使團的任務在後來被迫中止，部分原因可能是戰後美國的麥卡錫主義（McCarthyism）環境[3]。儘管美國在二戰期間同時與執政的國民政府和在野的中共合作的政策似乎有些相互矛盾，但事實上，所有與之相關的外交任務均由羅斯福政府一手批准執行。筆者承認，從美國的長期利益出發，考慮更多盟友選擇完全無可厚非。但是，這種兩面派做法可能足以表明當時的國民政府只不過被美國政府視作暫時拿來利用的工具而已。
After Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States formally formed a Wartime Alliance with China. The United States enunciated to have China(ROC) declared a major power in any postwar settlement. It was promised that ROC would gain sovereignty over all areas seized by Japan, especially Manchuria and Taiwan. But on the other hand, U.S. also sought to establish official relations with the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army. The United States Army Observation Group (i.e., the Dixie Mission) went to the Communist base camp at Yan’an to evaluate the possibility of U.S. aid to Communist forces. The investigation group advised that Chinese Communists might be useful wartime and postwar ally. Without a doubt, President Chiang Kai-shek condemned this proposal, as did the pro-Kuomintang factions in the American government. This mission was later aborted, partially due to the postwar atmosphere of McCarthyism [3]. Although clearly there was a discrepancy between U.S. policies towards the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communist Party(CCP), all interventions were put into motion through President Roosevelt's administration. The author admits that in the interest of long-term benefits of the United States, it is entirely legit to consider more options; however, this somewhat “double-dealing” may indicate that the Nationalist Government was only treated as a pawn by the U.S. Government.
1945年，隨著日本投降，中華民國國民政府與中國共產黨人之間醖釀已久的矛盾再次爆發。美國試圖通過干涉使雙方達成停火協議，並共同組建統一政府。1945年12月，哈里･杜魯門總統（Harry S. Truman，民主黨）先後派出了喬治･馬歇爾將軍（George Marshall）和阿爾伯特･魏德邁將軍（Albert Wedemeyer）作為代表前往中國，這就是後來爲人所知的馬歇爾和魏德邁任務（Marshall and Wedemeyer Missions）。
In 1945, as Japan surrendered, the long-simmering disputes between Nationalists and Communists erupted again. The United States Attempted to negotiate a ceasefire and to form a unified government between the two sides. In December of 1945, President Harry S. Truman (Democrat) successively sent General George Marshall and General Albert Wedemeyer as representatives to China, which is known as the Marshall and Wedemeyer Missions.
馬歇爾將軍向國會作證說，他認爲中華民國國民政府正在進行一場失敗的戰爭。他指出美國能做的只有以中間人的身份在國民政府和共產黨人之間進行調停；否則，美國將會捲入中國內戰之中。馬歇爾還警告說，如果美國在對中華民國的援助上消耗大量資源，將會反倒讓蘇聯有機可乘。他說道：「倘若傾全力去阻止並消滅中國的共產黨勢力…此舉顯然得不償失」[4]。不幸的是，馬歇爾未能在中華民國國民政府和中國共產黨之間建立持久的妥協。隨著雙方草率承諾的脆弱協議土崩瓦解，1946年初，國共矛盾最終升級爲一場全面內戰。
Marshall testified to Congress that he saw the Nationalists are fighting a losing war. He claimed that the only choice is to settle negotiations between Nationalists and Communists; otherwise, the United States would get involved in the Chinese Civil War. Marshall also warned that large dissipation of U.S. resources would inevitably play into the hands of the Soviet Union. He stated, “the cost of an all-out effort to see Communist forces resisted and destroyed in China...would clearly be out of all proportion to the results to be obtained” [4]. Unfortunately, Marshall failed to establish a lasting compromise between the Nationalists and Communists. As the fragile agreements between the two sides collapsed, a full-scale civil war began in early 1946.
與馬歇爾將軍相反，魏德邁將軍卻認爲繼續支持中華民國國民政府才能最好地維護美國利益。但是，杜魯門更願意在冒險下賭注之前先看到哪一方更有勝算。除此之外，杜魯門政府的其他成員認爲國民黨政權已經回天乏術，因此魏德邁將軍所代表的「親國民黨派」的意見普遍受到了壓制和否認。結果是，為了避免將美國捲入中國內戰，杜魯門拒絕對中國國民政府增加援助。
On the other side, Wedemeyer reported that U.S. interests were best served by continued support for the Nationalist Government. However, Truman preferred to see who would win first before taking any risk. Other members in the Truman administration saw the Nationalists as a lost cause, therefore, suppress Wedemeyer’s proposal. Consequently, to avoid being involved in the Chinese Civil War, Truman refused to expand the aid to Nationalists.
在美國國內以及海外親美社區中，美國價值觀，乃至西方價值觀，一直被視作一面團結民族主義者，保守主義者，以及反共人士的旗幟。但是，通過反思馬歇爾和魏德邁任務的失敗，不難看出美國政府對中國內戰議題的立場和抉擇基本上都是純粹基於對成本和收益的務實權衡，某種意義上可以説是絲毫不會顧慮是否會有悖那些所謂標誌性的「美國價值觀」。即便是明知縱容共產勢力在中國肆無忌憚地擴張可能會對整個東亞造成災難性的影響，美國仍然優先考慮其自身利益，在這場即將決定中國未來命運的戰爭中選擇了保持中立。
The American/Western values have always been used as a banner to unite nationalists, conservatives, and anti-CCP dissidents among the U.S. and overseas pro-American societies. However, by reflecting the failure of Marshall and Wedemeyer Missions, it is not hard to see that the U.S. Government’s decisions were almost purely based on practical evaluations of cost and benefit, not in the least guided by any of those iconic “American values.” Knowing that condoning Communist expansion in China could potentially impose disastrous impacts on East Asia, the United States still prioritized its interest and chose to stay neutral.
在奧巴馬政府執政期間，美國政治家約翰･麥凱恩（John McCain）曾經評論說，儘管中國可能與美國擁有共同利益，但中國並不和美國認同相同的價值觀[5]。此外，在最近的貿易戰中，政治分析師Andrew Leung聲稱，中國的崛起應當被視作「對以美國主導的或以美國價值觀為基礎的世界秩序的威脅」 [6]。這些義正辭嚴的評價看上去似乎彰顯著美國政府和西方社會已然對中共擺出了劍拔弩張的架勢，讓全球的反共產黨勢力歡欣鼓舞。然而，筆者相當懷疑美國人是否會僅僅出於其對「傳統價值觀」的信奉而真的和中共兵戎相見。試想在中國內戰時，美國甚至可以單純爲了不介入中國事務，完全放棄去支持一個現存執政且唯一官方代表「中國」的國民政府；今天的美國又憑什麽會冒險去支持一些僅僅存在於在社交網路上的所謂「中國民主運動」的鬆散組織？
During the Obama administration, the American statesman John McCain has commented that while China might have shared interests with the U.S., it did not share American values [5]. Additionally, amid the more recent trade war, the political analyst Andrew Leung claimed that China's rise is seen as a "threat to the world order underpinned by American dominance or American values” [6]. These statements may seem to be palatable at first glance and are prone to be interpreted as a real sign of the U.S.’ hardline position towards PRC. Nonetheless, the author seriously doubts that U.S. people would be likely to take actions merely out of their commitments to “American values.” If the U.S. doesn’t even intend to involve in China affairs by supporting an existing Nationalist Government, then why would it take any risk in backing some scrambled organizations labeled as “democracy movements of China” that only operate on social media?
現在我們繼續回到中國內戰的話題。當國民黨政府處於即將崩潰的邊緣時，美國反倒開始尋求與中共建立聯繫。正如約瑟夫･史迪威將軍（Joseph Stilwell）所說，與中國共產黨建立聯繫是爲了日後能從陸上反攻日本，這相當符合美國的利益。於是當毛澤東還沒有正式宣佈共產黨佔有中國主權的時候，美國大使司徒雷登（John Leighton Stuart）已經提前與中共領導人會面，討論未來美國對中華人民共和國統治的合法性的承認；儘管這些談判因爲毛澤東表明站在蘇聯一邊而以失敗告終。美國政府對中國內戰的模棱兩可的立場也反映在《中美關係白皮書》（The China White Paper）中 [7]，該檔聲稱美國之所以不參加中國內戰，是因為此舉既不應該也不會對結果有任何影響。此外，又如美國國務院（United States Department of State）發布的其他官方文件裡白紙黑字原話記載，杜魯門政府當時已準備放棄中華民國國民政府，甚至允許共產黨佔領臺灣 [8]。這麽看來，美國當時在中國問題上的立場可能已經不單單只是「模棱兩可」了。
We now get back to the Chinese Civil War. While the Nationalist Government was at the brink of collapse, U.S. started to seek connections with CCP. As general Joseph Stilwell argued, it was in the American interest to establish communication with the Communists to prepare for a land-based counteroffensive invasion of Japan. Even before Mao proclaimed the establishment of PRC sovereignty, U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart met with Communist leaders to discuss U.S. recognition of the PRC, even though those negotiations failed when Mao declared his intention to side with the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government’s ambiguous stance on the Chinese Civil War is also reflected in the China White Paper [7], which claimed that the United States had stayed out of the Chinese Civil war because it neither should nor could have influenced the outcome. Additionally, as stated in other official documents published by the United States Department of State, the Truman administration by then was prepared to abandon the Nationalists, even allowing the Communists to take over Taiwan [8]. Well, it turned out that the U.S. standpoint on China's issues was not just “ambiguous.”
1950年6月，由於北朝鮮軍隊越過北緯三十八度線入侵了南韓，美共兩政權都介入了這場爭端，並最終在朝鮮戰場激烈交火。中共以韓戰為由在國內點燃了強烈的反美情緒，這使得杜魯門政府不得已改變其之前對中國大陸的綏靖政策，並下定決心捍衛蔣中正在臺灣的政權。杜魯門這次突然轉變立場，也有可能是因爲其正遭受以麥卡錫主義爲代表的右翼勢力的猛烈抨擊，其迫於來自國內的公眾壓力，無奈之下只能顯示出對中國大陸的強硬態度[9]。相應地，美國派遣了第七艦隊進入臺灣海峽，以防止中共國通過軍事行動來「收復」臺灣（「收復」是美國政府的官方説法，正式檔案中所用的詞是「reclaim」而不是「invade」）。但即便如此美國依然在盡力避免與中共國發生全面衝突。證據之一便是：在麥克阿瑟將軍（Douglas MacArthur）向杜魯門政府請求授權其向中國大陸本土發動進攻後，他立即被解除了指揮權並被從朝鮮戰場上召回。
After the North Korean military crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea in June 1950, both U.S. and China join the fray and finally engaged in combat. As anti-American sentiment rose in PRC, the Truman administration was forced to change its earlier China policy and resolve to safeguard Chiang Kai-shek's regime in Taiwan. Truman's sudden shift of stance may be ascribed to the escalating public pressure driven by McCarthyism at that time [9]. Accordingly, U.S. sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to prevent the PRC from launching an attack to reclaim (U.S. Government officially used the word “reclaim,” not “invade”) Taiwan. However, it should be noted that United States was still refrained from a full-scale conflict with PRC, as General MacArthur was recalled from command in Korea by Truman after he called for authorization to launch an assault deep into Chinese territory.
儘管如此，不管這是否僅僅是杜魯門做出的一種政治妥協，不可否認的是他這次重新考量支持中華民國的決定仍然為美國之後至今對兩岸問題上的總體戰略奠定了基礎。隨著1954年第一次臺灣海峽危機的爆發，美國立即採取了干預以從政治和軍事上支持國民政府。 在此之後美國持續對蔣中正政府提供協助，同時督促蔣在臺灣實施各種社會和經濟層面的改革。1955年，美國參議院通過了臺灣決議案（Formosa Resolution of 1955），該決議授予美國總統特別的權力，以部署軍隊保護臺灣免受在大陸的中國共產黨人武裝襲擊。
Nevertheless, whether it was only a political compromise made by Truman, this reconsideration of supporting ROC still laid the groundwork for U.S.’ overarching strategies on Cross-Strait issues through the present day. As the First Taiwan Strait Crisis unfolded in 1954, the United States intervened to support the Nationalists. It continued to aid Chiang Kai-shek's government while also pushing it to implement various social and economic reforms in Taiwan. In 1955, the U.S. Senate passed the Formosa Resolution that granted the U.S. President the authority to deploy armies to protect Taiwan against armed attacks from Communists.
1958年，在毛澤東發動大躍進運動的同一年，中共軍隊砲擊了福建省沿海金門和馬祖群島上的國軍前哨。這次的局部衝突最終引發了第二次臺灣海峽危機。兩年後，德懷特･艾森豪總統（Dwight Eisenhower，共和黨）於6月在臺灣晉見了蔣中正總統。這次訪問進一步確定了美國捍衛中華民國（臺灣）的承諾，而艾森豪總統也被官方記錄為歷史上對「中國政府」進行正式訪問的第一位美國國家元首，因為在當時，美國仍然承認在臺灣的國民政府為中國的唯一合法政府 [10] 。
In 1958, the same year as Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, PRC shelled Nationalist outposts on Jinmen and Mazu Islands off Fujian Province's coast. These localized flare-ups sparked the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Two years later, President Dwight Eisenhower (Republican) met Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan in June, which confirmed the U.S.’ commitment to defend Taiwan. President Eisenhower was formally recorded as the first U.S. head of state to pay an official visit to “a Chinese Government” [8] because by then, U.S. still recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of China [10].
於此同時，中共國和蘇聯的關係繼續惡化。1961年後，蘇聯從大陸召回了最後一批科學和技術顧問，並切斷了所有援助。共蘇的徹底決裂促使美國（再一次）重新改變其對中國大陸的態度，因爲當時在美國眼中蘇聯顯然比中共國的威脅更大。甘迺迪（John Kennedy，民主黨）政府曾一度考慮與中國共產黨政權建交。雖然國務卿助理羅傑･希爾斯曼（Roger Hilsman）在一次公開演講中暗示，美國希望改善與中共政權的關係，但美國政府短期內並未採取任何行動。這可能是由於當時美國在越南不斷擴大的軍事行動對中共國構成了潛在威脅。在中國大陸出現了各種大規模示威，以指責美國的「帝國主義行徑」。
Meanwhile, the relationship between PRC and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate. After 1961, the USSR recalled its last scientific and technical advisors from the PRC and cut all assistance. The completion of the Sino-Soviet Split has spurred the U.S. to reevaluate its China policy (again) since the Soviet was perceived as a more dangerous threat. The Kennedy (Democrat) Administration once considered opening ties with communist China. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman hinted in a public speech that the United States wished to improve relations with the PRC, but no action was taken. This could be due to the large and growing U.S. presence in Vietnam, which posed a potential threat to the PRC, and the Chinese were engaged in mass demonstrations accusing the United States of imperialist actions.
甘迺迪總統於1963年11月22日被暗殺後，副總統林登･詹森（民主黨）取代了他的位置，並立即將政策重心放在戰爭上。詹森將越南戰爭標榜為「反對共產主義的戰爭」 [11]，並呼籲美國人全力以赴阻止任何形式的共產主義擴張。詹森的政策似乎讓反共人士看到了黎明，但他所許諾的正義征伐從來沒有發生過，因為與此同時，反戰運動的輿論勢力在美國占了上風。1968年秋天，理查･尼克森（Richard Nixon，共和黨）當選了總統，很大程度是因爲他所提議的「把美軍從越南撤出」的競選宣言獲得了大量選民的支持。很顯然，與其成為拯救世界於紅色瘟疫的英雄，美國人反而更願意關上門顧好自己的家內事（這完全符合古典自由意志主義，筆者對此並無批判的意思）。值得一提的是，在這個混亂的時期內，美國也停止了對中華民國（臺灣）的援助，對此的解釋是「表示對臺灣經濟的增長和穩定的肯定」 [8]。
After President Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963, Vice President Lyndon Johnson (Democrat) took his place and immediately focused on the war. Johnson labeled the Vietnam war as “the battle against communism” [11] and called for America to make a serious effort to stop all Communist expansion. Promising as it sounds, but the righteous crusade never happened as an anti-war movement gained traction in the United States at the same time. In the fall of 1968, Richard Nixon (Republican) was elected as President partly on his claim that he would get the United States out of Vietnam. Evidently, rather than being a hero to save the world from the red plague, Americans would instead care about themselves (this is totally conforming to classical libertarianism, and the author would not say there is anything wrong about it). It is worth noting that during this chaotic period, U.S. also halted the aid to Taiwan, with an explanation of “in recognition of the growth and stability of Taiwan’s economy” [8].
另一方面，中共國與蘇聯之間就東段中俄邊界問題長期以來一直存在分歧。在1969年，隨著雙方陷入局部武裝衝突，兩國之間的關係變得前所未有的險惡。蘇共兩政權愈演愈烈的爭端使得尼克森政府尋求對中國大陸關係的改善，從而孤立和壓制蘇聯。1971年，美國放寬了對中國的貿易和旅行限制。美國國家安全顧問基辛吉（Henry Kissinger）數次前往中國，目的是為尼克森總統訪北京做進一步準備。美國即將改變對中華人民共和國建國以來20多年保持外交不承認的態度，而基辛吉的此番訪問正標誌著華盛頓政府與北京政府之間和睦的開端。
On the other front, there was a longstanding dispute over the eastern border between the PRC and USSR. Tensions reached their peak in 1969 as the two sides broke into localized armed conflict. This conflict bolstered the Nixon Administration to improve relations with the PRC to isolate and pressure the Soviet Union. In 1971, United States eased trade and travel restrictions with China. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger made several trips to China to pave the way for President Nixon's visit. These trips marked the beginning of rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, after more than 20 years of non-recognition.
同年，隨著聯合國大會第2758號決議（United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758）的表決通過，中國在聯合國的席位被從在臺灣的中華民國移交到在大陸的中華人民共和國[12]。實際上，美國對這項提議投了反對票，而且在此筆者並沒有聲稱美國在此決議上「背叛」了中華民國（至少在當下還沒有）。但是，筆者仍然認為，基辛吉的訪問已經向全世界昭示了美國未來對中華人民共和國的外交態度，所以客觀上可能已經影響了這項決議投票的結果。
In the same year, with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 passed by vote, the Chinese seat in the United Nations was transferred from the ROC on Taiwan to the PRC in Mainland [12]. As a matter of fact, the U.S. voted against this proposal, and here the author is certainly not stating that the U.S. “betrayed” ROC (well, not to this point). However, the author still believes that Kissinger’s visits have shown a sign to the world of U.S. future diplomacy attitude towards PRC, which objectively could have been a contributing factor that tilted the balance.
1972年2月21日，尼克森總統抵達北京，成為歷史上第一位踏入中國大陸土地的美國國家元首。美國和中共共同發布了《中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國聯合公報》（上海公報）（Shanghai Communiqué）。在這份文件中，美國和中共陳述了雙方就一些關鍵問題上的立場，其中包括包括：
· 兩國聯合反抗蘇聯，
· 美國有意圖從臺灣撤軍，以及
· 美國支持「中國人自己和平解決臺灣問題」。
On February 21, 1972, President Nixon arrived in Beijing, becoming the first American head of state ever to set foot on the Chinese Mainland. Together, U.S. and PRC issued the Shanghai Communiqué. In this document, the United States and PRC stated their positions on several critical issues, including:
· joint opposition to the Soviet Union,
· the U.S. intention to withdraw its military from Taiwan, and
· U.S. support for a “peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”
正如多數官方歷史教科書中所描述，《上海公報》的簽署開啟了美共關係全面正常化的進程。1978年，在毛澤東逝世、鄧小平上位後，為了繼續推進兩國外交正常化，卡特總統（Jimmy Carter，民主黨）派遣了國家安全顧問茲比格涅夫･布熱津斯基（Zbigniew Brzezinski）前往大陸與鄧小平和其他中共領導人會晤。經過數月的談判交涉，兩邊政府在12月終於發表了建立全面外交關係的另一份聯合公報。該聲明[13]明確指出：
· 美國承認中華人民共和國政府為代表中國的唯一政府。
· 美國確認臺灣是中國的一部分
As would be described in most official history textbooks, the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué began the process of full normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC. In 1978, after the death of Mao and Deng's rise, to proceed on the process of normalization, President Carter (Democrat) dispatched National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to China to meet with Deng and other leaders. In December, after months of negotiations, the two governments finally issued a joint communiqué that established full diplomatic relations. This statement [13] articulates that:
· The United States recognized the PRC as the sole government of China.
· The United States affirmed that Taiwan is a part of China
如果說在過去，儘管其外交策略和立場變化無常，美國從未放棄承認中華民國（臺灣）政府是中國唯一的合法政府。在某種程度上，該公報可被視作美國對中華民國的、未徵求意見的單方面斷交聲明。雖然在世界上存在各種道德標準，但筆者認爲，無論是依據哪一套價值觀體系，1978年公報的設立都可被視為一種「背叛」行爲，即美利堅合眾國對中華民國的背叛。
In the past, despite its changeable diplomatic strategies, U.S. has never renounced the recognition that ROC (Taiwan) is the only legitimate government of China. To some extent, this communiqué can be considered a unilateral declaration of break-off from the U.S. without the ROC's consent. There are various moral standards and ethical systems in the world, but the author believes that according to most of them, the establishment of the 1978 communiqué would be considered an act of “betrayal,” a “betrayal” committed by the United States of America, to the Republic of China.
接下來的1979年，是中美關係史上的關鍵里程碑（也可以説是重大轉折點）。在這一年美國正式表明不再認同中華民國代表中國的合法地位，並僅承認中華人民共和國為唯一的「中國」。隨著美國駐臺北大使館（U.S. Embassy in Taipei）被關閉並被「遷居」北京，美國與中華民國之間的正式外交關係（official diplomatic relations）徹底終結。從此之後，美國一直與中華民國（臺灣）保持非正式外交關係（unofficial diplomatic relations）。此外，美國還於1980年1月1日廢止了與臺灣之間簽訂的長達25年的《中美共同防禦條約》（Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty）。
The following year, 1979, is a pivotal milestone in the history of U.S. – China relations. This year the U.S. formally de-recognized ROC and recognized the PRC as “China.” As U.S. Embassy in Taipei was “migrated” to Beijing and the Taiwanese Embassy in the U.S. was closed, the official diplomatic relations between U.S. and ROC have formally ended. Since then, U.S. has always been in an unofficial diplomatic relation with Taiwan. Moreover, after 35 years, the United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan on January 1, 1980.
筆者就此想要特別一提的是，美國當時並非完全無視臺灣的反彈和感受。此後不久卡特總統仍頒布了《臺灣關係法》（Taiwan Relations Act）以取代上述被終止的《共同防禦條約》。該新法案承諾美國會向臺灣提供軍事和其他方面的援助，並對未來的美臺貿易及其他關係提供了指導。但無論如何，美國政府這一番補救措施很容易被人解讀成一種想要大陸臺灣兩邊利益均沾的貪婪盤算。臺灣關係法的樹立就好比在故意打傷他人之後再叫救護車：問題的關鍵在於傷害從一開始就不應該發生。
The author would like to remark that the U.S. did not completely disregard Taiwan’s attitude. Later, President Carter still enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (in replacement of the terminated Mutual Defense Treaty), which committed the United States to provide military and other support for Taiwan and provided future trade guidelines and other relations. However, all these are prone to be interpreted as the continued double-dealing policies. This compensation can be analogized to calling an ambulance after deliberately injuring someone: the damage is not supposed to be done in the first place.
如果是從美國外交政策的角度來看，在1979年之前，合法的「中國（China）」指的是播遷臺灣的中華民國；相反，1979年以後，「中國（China）」一詞僅僅指的是占據大陸的中華人民共和國，而臺灣則成爲了另一個國家。美國為中共政權合法性背書並不是真的出於對中共有任何好感，或者説與中華民國有任何交惡。換句話説，美國的「背叛」也可以被渲染成爲了阻止共產主義向西方陣營的擴張的無奈選擇。但是，正如任何保守主義人士（或自封為保守主義者的人）所主張的那樣：意圖不能為行動辯護（intention does not justify actions）。無論是出於什麽崇高目的，美國主動與二戰中互相信賴的一位盟友斷交是既成事實。僅僅從客觀角度分析，我們完全可以說，中華民國長期作爲協助美國抵抗共產主義侵蝕的前哨陣地，最後卻被當成了棋盤上的棄子。可悲的是，在現如今的美國，兩岸問題已淪為被異見者拿來宣洩對精英階層的不滿，以及政客之間互相攻訐的武器。而具有諷刺意味的是，諸如「臺灣從來不是中國的一部分」之類的主張實際上反而是對中共代表中國的合法性的一種認同，也是對中華民國在那段艱難時期所做出的所有悲慘犧牲的一種褻瀆。
If it is viewed from the perspective of U.S. diplomatic policies, before 1979, the legal “China” refers to Taiwan; in contrast, after 1979, “China” only relates to Mainland, and Taiwan is another country. The actual purpose behind the U.S’ switch of diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC back then was to counter the political influences and military threats from the Soviet Union. But as any conservatives (or self-proclaimed conservatives) would argue: intention does not justify actions. It is a fact that U.S. has formally severed the bond with a reliable ally in WWII, who has also been acting as a forefront to resist the communist scourge. It is pathetic that in today’s America, the Taiwan issue has perverted into a tool only for nonconformists to ventilate discontentment towards the elite class. Ironically, ideas like “Taiwan is never part of China” actually endorse the CCP’s legitimacy to represent China and defiles the tragic sacrifice that the ROC has been made during these dire times.
於是我們走到了這段歷史旅程的盡頭。從1980年代所謂「中美關係開始正常化」開始，美共之間直到今天（2021年）的外交主題實則上是過去四十年的重複，只不過勉強算是一個稍微溫和點的版本。美國和中共國雙方都有可能僅在幾個月內完全改變之前的政策和意識形態；不過鑑於兩國之間尷尬的外交歷史，這種種鬧劇都已經見怪不怪。如果說這後四十年和前四十年之間有什麽不同，那便是美共之間的的關聯變得日益牢固的現實。換句話説，與40年前相比，美國更加不可能願意與中共國爆發全面衝突。
That brings us to the end of our journey. Starting from the normalization beginning in the 1980s, the diplomatic theme between U.S. and China till today (2021) is essentially a repetition of the last four decades, only in a more moderate magnitude. Both sides could potentially change their policies and ideologies to the opposite only in months, which has proved to be a common practice given the embarrassing history. If there is any difference, it would be the fact that the bond between U.S. and PRC only got cemented, i.e., the possibility of the U.S. going into a full-blown conflict with the PRC has only been diminished compared to 40 years ago.
筆者對在二戰期間與中華民國並肩作戰的英勇的美軍士兵表示崇高的敬意，並對美國國內為中國人權問題發聲的社會活動家表示由衷的感謝。誠然，美國優秀的政治制度應當被視作促進世界各地發展中國家民主化進程的範本。但即便如此，我們同時不應忽視外交關係背後的欺詐，虛僞和殘酷。從以上我們討論的所有歷史證據來看，結論是顯而易見的：指望美國成為中國民主未來的救世主只不過是癡心妄想。
The author shows great admiration to the honorable U.S. soldiers who have valiantly fought side by side with ROC during World War II and is grateful for American activists’ effort in promoting human rights awareness for Chinese people. There is no denying that U.S. political system should be seen as a prototype for facilitating democratic progress in developing countries. However, one should not neglect the deceptions, falseness, and cruelty that underpin international relations. Judging from all historical evidence we have discussed so far, the conclusion would be clear: counting on the U.S. to be the savior for China’s democracy would literally be an illusion.
政治固有的骯髒並不一定意味著崇高願景與務實工作二者不可兼得。但我們目前必須面對的無情事實是：美國對解決中共對臺灣、香港乃至東亞的長期威脅，既沒有任何興趣也沒有任何義務。民主革命絕不只是從振臂一揮中所獲得的那種淋漓暢快的刺激。邁向民主的第一步必須是無條件接受客觀的現實，無論其多麽的黑暗嚴酷。民主革命的策展需要對痛苦的忍耐，清醒的意識和理性的策略。從一位真正的中華民國愛國者的角度來看，美國的干預在某種程度上確實可以成爲左右吾輩復國偉業成敗的決定因素，但其前提在於我們必須自己努力奮鬥在先，為西方反共勢力的協助創造成熟的機遇和環境。至少，這是我們應當從歷史中所習得的教訓。
The inherent dirtiness of politics does not necessarily imply that one cannot be practical while working for a noble cause. Still, one must also acknowledge the bitter fact that U.S. has no interest and obligation in solving the longstanding threat of CCP to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and even East Asia. A revolution is not a cathartic experience with raised arms, adrenaline rush, and frenzied ecstasy. One must acknowledge that the first step towards democracy is the acceptance of the brutal reality. The curation of a revolution requires patience, consciousness, and strategies. From the perspective of a true nationalist of ROC, indeed U.S. interventions can facilitate the progress of restoring our nation, but it would be preposterous to hope for any assistance from the western world without first creating the necessary conditions by ourselves. At least, this is what history has taught us.
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